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Abstract 
The similarity of states’ foreign policy positions is a standard variable in the dyadic analysis of 
international relations. Recent studies routinely rely on Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) S to assess 
the similarity of foreign policy ties. However, S neglects two fundamental characteristics of the 
international state system: foreign policy ties are relatively rare and individual states differ in 
their innate propensity to form such ties. I propose two chance-corrected agreement indices, 
Scott’s (1955) pi and Cohen’s (1960) κ, as viable alternatives. Both indices adjust the dyadic 
similarity score for a large number of common absent ties. Cohen’s κ also takes into account 
differences in individual dyad members’ total number of ties. The resulting similarity scores 
have stronger face validity than S. A comparison of their empirical distributions and a replication 
of Gartzke’s (2007) study of the ‘Capitalist Peace’ indicate that the different types of measures 
are not substitutable. 
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1 Introduction 
The similarity of states’ foreign policy positions is a standard variable in the quantitative, dyadic 
analysis of international relations. The variable is supposed to capture the extent to which pairs 
of states have shared or opposing interests. Explicitly or implicitly, the degree of similar or 
opposing state interests forms part of most explanations for international cooperation and 
conflict. For example, similar state interests are hypothesised to foster bilateral trade (Kastner 
2007; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998), to increase the chances of receiving military and 
development aid (Derouen and Heo 2004; Neumayer 2003), to improve the effective functioning 
of international institutions (Stone 2004), to reduce the incentives to harbour foreign terrorist 
groups (Bapat 2007), and, of course, to decrease the risk of conflict and militarized disputes 
(Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Braumoeller 2008; Gartzke 2007; Long and Leeds 2006).  
Yet despite the importance of this variable, the measurement of foreign policy similarity 
has received little attention. Bueno de Mesquita (1975) originally proposed Kendall’s (1938) 
rank-order correlation coefficient τb as a measure of similarity. According to this measure, the 
foreign policy ties of two states are maximally similar if their rankings exhibit perfect 
covariation. Signorino and Ritter (1999) objected to the use of τb on conceptual grounds. They 
argue that τb does not indicate the extent to which two states share the same types of foreign 
policy ties to other states, but only the extent to which the two states rank their foreign policy ties 
to other states in a similar manner (Signorino and Ritter 1999, 121). Signorino and Ritter (1999) 
propose S as an alternative measure. According to this measure, the foreign policy tie profiles of 
two states are maximally similar if they match exactly, regardless of whether or not the strength 
of foreign policy ties covaries. Signorino and Ritter’s S has since become the prevailing measure 
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of foreign policy positions in the statistical analyses of international relations.1 Despite its 
growing popularity, few studies have subsequently examined the properties of S. While Bennett 
and Rupert (2003) and Sweeney and Keshk (2005) have pointed to some empirical and 
conceptual problems of S, they have not suggested feasible alternatives. 
In this paper, I discuss the application of chance-corrected agreement indices to assess the 
similarity of states’ foreign policy positions. Even though these measures have been developed in 
a different context for different research applications, their conceptual properties make them 
uniquely suited for measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions in the study of 
international relations. The inquiry is motivated by the observation that S often yields 
implausible similarity scores. The lack of face validity of S is illustrated in the left panel of 
Figure 1. The figure indicates similarity scores of the United Kingdom (UK) with the other four 
permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council during the Cold War. In line 
with most existing research, the reported S values are based on data about dyad members’ 
alliance ties with all other states in the international system. The assumption underlying the use 
of these data is that any similarity in alliance commitments is a result of similar foreign policy 
positions (Altfeld and Mesquita 1979, 116). We know that the UK’s security interests during the 
Cold War were relatively close to those of France and the United States (US). At the same time, 
the UK had very different interests from those of China and the Soviet Union. The S values for 
                                                 
1
 A search in the Social Science Citation Index for articles citing Signorino and Ritter (1999) 
returns 126 matches (http://isiwebofknowledge.com [accessed April 26, 2011]). A similar search 
in Google Scholar returns 273 hits (http://scholar.google.com [accessed April 26, 2011]). While 
S might not have completely replaced τb, I am not aware of any recent study that relies 
exclusively on τb, without reporting results with S as well. 
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the UK-France dyad and the UK-US dyad are roughly in line with the historical record. 
However, the UK-Soviet Union and UK-China dyads show S values that are too high in 
comparison. During the entire period, the UK’s S score with the Soviet Union is very similar and 
sometimes even higher than its S score with the US. The S values for the UK-China dyad are 
even more implausible. They indicate that, during the entire Cold War period, the interests of the 
UK were considerably more similar to those of China than to those of the US. 
FIGURE 1 about here 
In the remainder of this paper, I show that the lack of face validity of S is a result of the 
measure’s way of standardizing the extent of dissimilarity of states’ foreign policy tie profiles. 
At its core, S measures the dissimilarity of states’ tie profiles and adjusts it for the theoretically 
possible maximum dissimilarity. Features of the observed empirical distributions of individual 
dyad members’ foreign policy ties are not taken into account. In substantive terms, the 
distribution-independent standardization in the calculation of S implies that the measure neglects 
two fundamental aspects of the international state system: the low density of foreign policy ties 
in the system and the innate differences of individual states to form such ties. In contrast, chance-
corrected agreement indices offer distribution-dependent ways of standardizing the extent of 
dissimilarity. Scott’s (1955) pi and Cohen’s (1960) κ adjust the observed dissimilarity of tie 
profiles for a generally low propensity of dyad members to form foreign policy ties. In addition, 
κ takes into account that individual dyad members may differ in their propensity to form ties.  
Before discussing the calculation and advantages of these indices in more detail, it is worth 
having a preliminary look at the resulting empirical differences in the similarity values of the 
different measures. The middle and right panel of Figure 1 show the UK’s similarity scores 
based on pi and κ, respectively. The similarity scores for the UK-France and the UK-US dyad 
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remain positive and relatively large when the agreement indices are applied instead of S. 
However, the scores for the UK-China and the UK-Soviet Union dyad are now much lower and 
consistently negative for most of the time period examined. While the differences between pi and 
κ are generally small, the significantly lower pi score of the UK-China dyad is noteworthy. 
Keeping their minor differences in mind, we can conclude for the moment that the two chance-
corrected agreement indices produce similarity scores that are clearly more in line with the 
conventional wisdom about states’ foreign policy positions during the Cold War than S. 
In the next section, I present a brief review of how similarity scores are calculated 
according to S. Then I describe in more detail the two weaknesses of S that result in implausible 
similarity scores. Having identified the problems affecting S, I propose Cohen’s κ and Scott’s pi 
as two useful alternatives and describe their computation. For conceptual clarity and ease of 
exposition, my discussion of the limitations of S and the computation of pi and κ relies on data 
about binary foreign policy ties. As most current applications use valued tie data to measure the 
similarity of foreign policy positions, I subsequently describe extensions of pi and κ to assess the 
similarity of ties whose strength is measured on a quantitative scale.2 Empirical comparisons of 
                                                 
2
 I borrow the distinction between binary and valued data from social network analysis. The 
former type of data indicates only the presence or absence of ties, while the latter also indicates 
the strength of ties (Scott 2000, 47). The version of κ for valued or quantitative data is also 
known as weighted κ (Cohen 1968), ̅ (Krippendorff 1970), chance-corrected identity 
coefficient (Zegers 1986), concordance correlation coefficient (Lin 1989), and fixed marginal 
agreement coefficient (Fay 2005). The version of pi for quantitative data is also known as   
(Krippendorff 1970) and random marginal agreement coefficient (Fay 2005). All similarity 
measures discussed in this paper are available for download from AUTHOR’S WEBPAGE. This 
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those measures show that the distribution of S strongly differs from the distributions of the two 
chance-corrected indices. Thus, the two types of measures are clearly not interchangeable. This 
conclusion is also confirmed by a replication of Gartzke’s (2007) study of the ‘Capitalist Peace’. 
The replication results demonstrate that the two types of similarity measures can lead to 
substantially different statistical inferences. Although the two chance-corrected indices yield 
similar values and replication results in these examples, the use of one or the other implies very 
different assumptions about the data generation process. Thus, the decision about which chance-
corrected index to apply should be guided by theoretical considerations. 
2 Measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions with S 
Foreign policy positions of states are hard to observe directly. One way to measure them is to 
rely on an indicator of observable behavior that ‘reveals’ the preferences responsible for 
generating that behavior. Traditionally, data on alliance portfolios have been used to assess the 
similarity of foreign policy positions (Altfeld and Mesquita 1979). For ease of exposition, I 
follow this convention in the conceptual discussion and comparison of similarity measures.3 The 
assumption underlying the use of alliance data is that similar alliance portfolios are the result of 
                                                                                                                                                             
collection includes measures based on binary as well as valued ties for all state system members 
(Correlates of War Project 2005), calculated from alliance (1816-2000) and UN voting data 
(1946-2004). The ‘rmac’ package (Kirk 2010) in R (R Development Core Team 2011) 
implements the computation of the interrater-agreement indices as described by Fay (2005). 
3
 In principle, similarity measures can be calculated with any relational data set (Sweeney and 
Keshk 2005). Besides alliance data,  the use of data on voting in the UN General Assembly has 
been popular (Gartzke 1998). The empirical comparison in Section 5 involves measures based on 
UN voting data as well. 
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similar foreign policy positions. A state’s alliance portfolio can be represented in the form of a 
vector, where the individual entries of the vector indicate the existence and the strength of its 
alliance commitments with other states in the international system. The strength of alliance 
commitments can range from ‘no commitment’, ‘entente’, ‘neutrality or nonaggression pact’, to 
‘defense pact’4. All similarity measures aim to assess the dissimilarity of the alliance 
commitment vectors of the two dyad members and then convert it into a similarity score. The 
measures even calculate the dissimilarity of the two vectors in exactly the same way. Both S and 
the chance-corrected agreement indices appraise dissimilarity through a simple distance function. 
The subsequent conversion of the dissimilarity into a similarity score is also the same. The 
measures only differ in the way in which dissimilarity values are standardized. As mentioned 
earlier, these differences in the standardization result in crucial differences in similarity scores. 
Before turning to a discussion of the chance-corrected agreement indices, I review the 
computation of S and investigate the reasons for its lack of face validity. Equation (1) presents a 
simplified version of the formula for the calculation of S: 
    	 
 ∑|  |∑  										 
The more general formula given by Signorino and Ritter (1999, 127) does not specify a specific 
distance metric and allows for the incorporation and differential weighting of additional types of 
foreign policy ties. In practice, most existing research has relied on the absolute value distance 
                                                 
4
 The vectors also include an entry for each of the dyad members. Relationships of states to 
themselves are coded as defence pacts and therefore receive the maximum scale value (Bueno de 
Mesquita 1975, 195). 
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metric |  | and a single data source to calculate S values.5 The more general formula for S 
also allows weighting foreign policy ties by countries’ importance. Indeed, Signorino and Ritter 
(1999, 133) suggest weighting ties by countries’ material capabilities (Correlates of War Project 
2005) to deal with the problem of the preponderance of absent alliance ties. However, this 
procedure is problematic. The distribution of material capabilities of states is extremely skewed. 
Capability-weighting means that a lot of information about most countries is effectively 
discarded from the sample (e.g., the five largest powers in 1985 contribute more than 50 per cent 
to the calculation of dissimilarity values in that year).  
The effective restriction of the sample to a few very powerful states leads only to more 
plausible S scores if those states have a higher propensity to establish foreign policy ties than the 
excluded, less powerful ones. Such a relationship will then result in generally less and more 
meaningful shared absences of foreign policy ties. While such a positive association between 
material capabilities and the total number of foreign policy ties indeed exists, it is far from 
perfect. Thus, weighting is at best a second-best solution. Chance-corrected agreement indices 
provide a solution that does not rely on an additional data source with all its potential for 
introducing further measurement error. Also, a more fundamental objection is that weighting is 
essentially a sampling decision and should be made independent of measurement issues. If 
weighting ties is deemed desirable to assess the similarity of foreign policy positions, then any 
measure of similarity should be calculated on weighted data, including Scott’s pi and Cohen’s κ. 
Relying on equation (1), Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of S with a hypothetical 
example. The data consist of binary alliance ties indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of any 
alliance commitment between dyad members X and Y and the other states A to H in the 
                                                 
5
 The squared distance metric    would be a prominent alternative. 
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international system. Relying on binary data makes the exposition easier and allows us to 
distinguish qualitative properties of the different measures from properties of the distance metric. 
Unless stated otherwise, all discussed issues apply analogously to valued tie data as well. 
Regarding the entries in Panel (a) of Figure 2, the first row of the matrix indicates that state X has 
an alliance commitment to itself while state Y does not have an alliance commitment to state X. 
The second row indicates the converse situation. State Y has an alliance commitment to itself but 
not to state X. The other rows provide information about the two dyad members’ alliance 
commitments to the remaining states in the international system. The two tie profiles are similar 
in that both states share an alliance commitment to state E and both do not have alliance 
commitments with states C, D, G, and H. However, the two tie profiles are dissimilar in that only 
X has an alliance commitment to B and only Y has an alliance commitment to A and F.  
FIGURE 2 about here 
We can compute the S score of the X-Y dyad directly from the matrix given in Panel (a) of 
Figure 2. First, we calculate the absolute distances |  | between the entries in columns X 
and Y. In a second step, we sum the absolute distances across rows, which yields the observed 
dissimilarity (Do = 5) of the two tie profiles. The observed dissimilarity is then standardized by 
dividing it by the maximum possible dissimilarity (Dmax). In the case of binary data, the 
maximum possible dissimilarity of individual alliance ties (dmax) is 1, so the maximum possible 
dissimilarity is 1 times the number of countries n, which results in Dmax = ndmax = n = 10. The 
resulting measure is a proportion that can take values between 0 and 1. In this case, the 
proportion of dissimilar ties is 0.5 (Pd = Do/Dmax = 5/10 = 0.5).  
We can derive the proportion of dissimilarity value more easily from a contingency table. 
The contingency table view is useful because it provides a straightforward summary of the main 
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features of the data that are relevant for assessing the dissimilarity of two tie profiles. The entries 
in the diagonal cells of the contingency table with absolute frequencies (a = 4 and d = 1) in Panel 
(b) of Figure 2 indicate the number of similar alliance ties and the entries in the off-diagonal 
cells (b = 3 and c = 2) indicate the number of dissimilar alliance ties. The observed total 
dissimilarity between tie profiles is equal to the total number of dissimilar alliance ties and can 
be derived by simply adding up the entries in the off-diagonal cells of the table (Do = 3 + 2 = 5). 
Dividing the total number of dissimilar alliance ties by the total number of countries yields the 
proportion of dissimilarity (Pd = Do/Dmax = 5/10 = 0.5).  
When the contingency table indicates relative rather than absolute frequencies, the 
proportion of dissimilarity can be computed even more directly by just adding up the relative 
frequencies in the off-diagonal cells of the table.6 In this case, no further division by the total 
number of countries is required. No matter how the proportion of dissimilarity is derived, it is 
subsequently multiplied by 2 and subtracted from 1 to transform it from a dissimilarity measure 
with a theoretical range between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates complete dissimilarity, to a similarity 
measure with a theoretical range between -1 and 1, where 1 indicates complete similarity. In the 
example, this linear transformation results in an S value of zero (S = 1 – 2[0.5] = 0). 
The example shows that S scores are a direct function of the proportion of dissimilarity. 
The proportion of dissimilarity has the same value regardless of whether dissimilar ties are 
distributed equally across all off-diagonal cells or concentrated in one of those cells. The 
proportion is also not affected by the distribution of similar ties across the diagonal cells of the 
contingency table. This insensitivity of S to the distribution of similar and dissimilar ties across 
                                                 
6
 Because of this simplicity, I make extensive use of contingency tables presenting relative 
frequencies or proportions in the remainder of this paper.  
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their respective cells in the contingency table is problematic.7 As Figure 3 demonstrates, the 
same proportion of dissimilarity can mean very different things, mainly as a result of how dyad 
members’ marginal distributions constrain the way similar and dissimilar ties are distributed over 
their respective cells.8  
FIGURE 3 about here 
                                                 
7
 According to Signorino and Ritter (1999, 121-123), the main advantage of S over association 
measures like  is exactly this insensitivity to the lack or form of covariation. However, 
inferring the similarity of foreign policy positions by comparing dyad members’ behaviour is 
only possible by assessing the degree to which dyad members’ behaviour varies in similar ways. 
Covariation between variables is generally accepted as one of the main conditions for 
establishing causality (De Vaus 2001, 34; Kellstedt and Whitten 2008, 48). Thus, if two tie 
profiles do not covary or covary in a negative way, then they are clearly not causally related to 
similar foreign policy positions. Also in this sense, Scott’s pi and Cohen’s κ are improvements. 
Cohen’s κ is actually a chance-corrected measure of association (Zegers 1986), and Scott’s pi will 
never indicate a positive similarity value in the absence of a positive association between the tie 
profiles (Fay 2005, 175). From this point of view, the problem of  is not its reliance on 
covariation, but its lack of chance-correction. 
8
 The issues discussed here have long been identified in the literature on assessing inter-rater 
agreement. However, in that context, they have usually been interpreted as problems of Cohen’s 
κ rather than problems of the proportion of dissimilarity (Byrt, Bishop, and Carlin 1993; 
Cicchetti and Feinstein 1990; Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990; Lantz and Nebenzahl 1996; Sim and 
Wright 2005). For an exception, see Vach (2005).  
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In Panel (a), the marginal distributions indicate that both dyad members have a 50 per cent 
propensity to establish an alliance. In this case, the marginal distribution put no constraint on the 
empirically possible minimum and maximum dissimilarity value. As the lower two tables in 
Panel (a) illustrate, the proportion of dissimilarity could take any value between 0 and 100 per 
cent, so the observed proportion of dissimilarity of 40 per cent provides a reasonable assessment 
of the two tie profiles’ dissimilarity. The situation is different in Panels (b) and (c). Panel (b) 
depicts the case in which both states have a low propensity of only 20 per cent to establish an 
alliance. In other words, the marginal distributions are symmetrically unbalanced. As a result, 
non-alliance ties are generally more ‘prevalent’ than alliance ties.9 In this case, a proportion of 
dissimilarity of 40 per cent is much more ‘impressive’. Given the marginal distributions, the 
lower two tables in Panel (b) demonstrate that the proportion of dissimilarity can only vary 
between 0 and 40 per cent. Thus, the observed proportion of dissimilarity is actually at its 
empirically possible maximum. The two alliance profiles could not be any more different in this 
situation. However, the proportion of dissimilarity and, by implication, S does not reflect this 
fact. Panel (c) presents the case in which the two dyad members differ strongly in their 
propensity to establish an alliance. In other words, they exhibit ‘biased’ propensities. State X has 
a high propensity of 70 per cent, but state Y has only a low propensity of 30 per cent. This means 
                                                 
9
 See especially Byrt and colleagues (1993) for the use of the terms ‘prevalence’ and ‘bias’ in the 
context of agreement indices. ‘Prevalence’ refers to symmetrically unbalanced marginal 
distributions in a contingency table, and ‘bias’ to asymmetrically unbalanced marginal 
distributions. In the case of alliance data, prevalence manifests itself in the preponderance of no-
alliance ties and bias in a strongly disparate number of alliance partners of the two dyad 
members (e.g. the United States-Switzerland dyad post World War II).  
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the marginal are asymmetrically unbalanced. In this case, the proportion of dissimilarity of 40 
per cent is not very impressive. Given dyad members’ marginal distributions, the lower two 
tables of Panel (c) show that the proportion of dissimilarity can only take values between 40 and 
100 per cent. Thus, the observed proportion of dissimilarity is actually at its empirically possible 
minimum; it could not be any smaller. This information is also not reflected in the S score.  
As discussed earlier, networks in international relations often exhibit low density. The 
establishment and maintenance of bilateral relationships between states are usually costly. As a 
result, these relationships are relatively rare and the absence of ties is much more common. 
Panel (b) of Figure 3 illustrates that in such situations the unadjusted proportion of dissimilarity 
tends to indicate too little dissimilarity, resulting in S scores that seem too high. While this 
prevalence of non-ties is widely accepted as a problem for measuring the similarity of foreign 
policy ties (Bennett and Rupert 2003, 372; Signorino and Ritter 1999, 124; Sweeney and Keshk 
2005, 175), the differential biases of states as a source of implausible similarity values might be 
more controversial. Yet if foreign policy ties are costly to establish and maintain, then states are 
likely to differ systematically in their willingness and capability to bear such costs. For example, 
the United States are much more prepared and able to maintain an extensive net of alliance 
partners around the globe than Luxembourg. The degree to which states engage in alliance 
commitments is first and foremost driven by capability. If Luxembourg does not have the 
capability to come to the aid of Bolivia and Bolivia does not have the capability to come to the 
aid of Luxembourg in the case of a militarized conflict, then a defence pact between those two 
states seems unlikely. But even if a state is generally capable of projecting its force overseas, it 
might regard military alliances as an inadequate means to pursue its security interests and 
therefore consciously limit its engagement in these kinds of international arrangements. Neither 
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the capability nor the general willingness to engage in military alliances reveals underlying 
foreign policy preferences. Foreign policy preferences are mainly reflected in the state’s choice 
of alliance partners given a specific propensity to engage in such behaviour, less so in the 
propensity to engage in such behaviour itself. Panel (c) of Figure 3 demonstrates that such 
differences in the propensity of states to form alliances will result in an unadjusted proportion of 
dissimilarity that indicates more dissimilarity than warranted, resulting in similarity scores of S 
that seem too low. 
The independence of the propensity to form foreign policy ties from the choice of partner 
might vary with the costs involved in establishing and maintaining a tie. The assumption is 
certainly quite plausible in the case of alliance commitments, but might be less justifiable for 
‘cheaper’ types of ties. A prime example of less costly relationships would be ties formed 
through identical or similar voting in the UN General Assembly (e.g. Gartzke 1998). In this case, 
the act of voting is equally costly, regardless of whether the country votes ‘Yes’, ‘Abstain’, or 
‘No’. The only cost a country might incur in these situations is directly related to which other 
countries it chooses to support or oppose through its vote. In this case, asymmetrically 
distributed marginals are mainly due to real differences in foreign policy positions. Fortunately, 
chance-corrected agreement indices can handle both situations. Cohen’s κ corrects the proportion 
of dissimilarity for both prevalence and bias, but Scott’s pi only corrects it for the prevalence of a 
certain type of tie. The latter measure is therefore more appropriate in the case where foreign 
policy ties are cheap. In the next section, I describe the computation of both measures. 
3 Chance-correction to account for prevalence and bias 
A certain proportion of dissimilar alliance ties is ‘harder’ to achieve in the face of symmetrically 
unbalanced marginal distributions (i.e. prevalence) than in the face of balanced marginal 
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distributions. In contrast, the same proportion of dissimilarity is ‘easier’ to achieve in the face of 
asymmetrically unbalanced marginal distributions (i.e. bias) than in the face of balanced 
marginal distributions. Thus, the proportion of dissimilarity needs to be adjusted upward in the 
case of prevalence and downward in the case of bias. Chance-corrected agreement indices 
accomplish both of these tasks. In general, these indices take the following form (e.g. 
Krippendorff 1970, 140): 
	 orrtd	grmt    '(') 											 
Do stands for the observed dissimilarity and De for the dissimilarity expected by chance. In the 
case of binary data, Do is the sum of the proportions pij in the off-diagonal cells of the 
contingency table, where i,j = 0,...,k indicate the row and column numbers: 
'( *+,
-,
									. 
De is calculated by multiplying the hypothesized marginal proportions of the two raters mi. and 
mj. for each off-diagonal category ij and by adding up the resulting products:  
') */0/0,
-,
										1 
The only difference in the calculation of chance-corrected agreement measures lies in the 
definition of the hypothesized marginal proportions /0 and	/0 (Zwick 1988, 376). Even S can 
be reformulated as a chance-corrected agreement index. In this case, the hypothesized marginal 
proportions are /0 	/0,   	⁄  for both the highest and lowest rating category 34 5 6 74 89 and 
zero otherwise. Plugging these values into equation (4), chance disagreement for S is calculated 
as follows: 
'):  ;	<

=	;	<

 											> 
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Inserting this result and the right-hand side of equation (3) into equation (2) yields S, expressed 
as a chance-corrected agreement index: 
    ∑ +,-,
	
										? 
Equation (6) can easily be reformulated to     	∑ +,-, . We have seen earlier that the 
proportion of dissimilarity ∑ +,-,  is the same as the standardized distance ∑|  | ∑ ⁄  
in equation (1), thus the two formulas are equivalent. The main difference between S and chance-
corrected agreement indices is that the ‘chance-correction’ of S is calculated independently of the 
observed marginal distributions of the two dyad members, while the chance-corrections of pi and 
κ take the form of the marginal distributions into account. For S, the expected dissimilarity is 
always 50 per cent, regardless of the prevalence of a certain tie or the differential biases of dyad 
members. In the case of binary data, the chance-correction of S reduces to the assumption that all 
states are just as likely to form alliance ties as they are likely to form non-alliance ties.10 The 
expected dissimilarity defines the zero value of chance-corrected coefficients (Krippendorff 
2004, 416). Thus, whenever the actual marginal distributions deviate from the form of the 
marginal distributions assumed by S, the similarity values of S will be over- or understated.  
Scott’s pi chance-correction adjusts for prevalence, but assumes that states do not exhibit 
any biases. In our context, the measure assumes that all states have a similar propensity to 
engage in military alliances; the ‘true’ marginal distributions of the two dyad members are 
supposed to be homogenous (Zwick 1988, 367). However, unlike S which assumes an identical 
                                                 
10
 In the case of valued data, the standardization is equivalent to assuming that all states have a 
50 per cent propensity to form a tie with the theoretically possible maximum strength and a 50 
per cent propensity to form a tie with the theoretically possible minimum strength. 
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propensity of 0.5, pi does not assume that states’ common propensity to form alliance ties takes 
any specific value. Rather, dyad members’ common propensity is estimated from the data in the 
contingency table by averaging the respective marginal proportions: 
/0 
+0 = +0
	 d	/0, 
@+,0 = +0,A
	  
The estimated marginal proportions are then used to calculate the expected chance dissimilarity 
by plugging them into equation (4). Given the assumption of homogeneous marginal 
distributions, the chance-correction of pi takes the following form: 
')B  *;+0 = +0	 <-,
;+,0 = +0,	 <										C 
Inserting the right-hand sides of equations (7) and (3) into equation (2) yields the formula for 
Scott’s pi: 
D    ∑ +,-,
∑ E+0 = +0	 F-, ;
+,0 = +0,
	 <
										G 
Unlike S and Scott’s pi, Cohen’s κ does not make the assumption of marginal homogeneity 
(Zwick 1988). Variation in states’ propensity to form ties is not taken as a sign of dissimilarity 
but considered to be due to causes unrelated to the choice of tie partner. The calculation of κ’s 
chance-dissimilarity relies directly on the observed marginal proportions as best guesses for the 
‘true’ marginal proportions: /0  +0 and 	/0,  +0,. Inserting these terms into equation (4) 
yields the following formula for the chance-correction of κ:  
')H  *+0+0,
-,
										I 
Inserting the right-hand side of equations (9) and (3) into equation (2) gives the formula for 
Cohen’s κ: 
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J    ∑ +,-,∑ +0+0,-, 										K 
The calculation of the different measures and the effects of prevalence and bias are best 
illustrated through a few examples. Figure 4 illustrates the computation of the similarity 
measures in the absence of bias and prevalence. In this hypothetical example, alliance ties are 
just as common as non-alliance ties and both dyad members have the same propensity to form 
alliance ties. The observed proportion of dissimilarity is calculated by adding up the proportions 
in the off-diagonal cells of the contingency table: 
'( *+,
-,
 +L = +L  KM	K = KM	K  KM1K 
The observed proportion of dissimilarity is always the same for all three similarity measures. 
However, in the absence of bias and prevalence, the chance-dissimilarity is the same for all three 
measures as well. In this situation, the hypothesized marginal proportions are /0 	/0,  KM>, 
regardless of the different assumptions about the ‘true’ marginal distributions:  
'):  KM> = KM>  KM	> = KM	>  KM> 
')B  *;+0 = +0	 <-,
;+,0 = +0,	 <  ;
KM> = KM>
	 <

= ;KM> = KM>	 <

 KM	> = KM	>  KM> 
')H  *+0+0,
-,
 KM> = KM>  KM	> = KM	>  KM> 
As a consequence of the equality of the marginal proportions, the proportion of dissimilarity 
expected by chance is 0.5 for all three measures as well. In the example, the chance-dissimilarity 
is slightly larger than the actually observed dissimilarity of 0.4, resulting in a moderately positive 
similarity score of 0.2. 
FIGURE 4 about here 
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If the marginal distributions are unbalanced in one way or another, the different indices give 
different results. An instance in which the data indicate the prevalence of non-alliance ties is 
illustrated in the upper half of Figure 5. The proportion of dissimilarity is the same as in the 
previous example, but this time all shared ties are concentrated in the top left cell of the table 
indicating the absence of alliance commitments. The two states do not have a single alliance 
commitment in common. Given their marginal distributions, the two states’ alliance portfolios 
are as dissimilar as they can possibly be. However, S does not take this information into account. 
The marginal proportions for the chance-correction are calculated in exactly the same way as in 
the previous example, resulting in the same chance-dissimilarity score of 0.5 and hence the same 
similarity score of 0.2. In contrast, the chance corrections of pi and κ adjust their similarity scores 
for the fact that non-alliance ties are more frequent than alliance ties: 
'):  KM> = KM>  KM	> = KM	>  KM> 
')B  *;+0 = +0	 <-,
;+,0 = +0,	 <  ;
KMG = KM	
	 <

= ;KM	 = KMG	 <

 KM? = KM?  KM.	 
')H  *+0+0,
-,
 KMGKM	 = KM	KMG  KM? = KM?  KM.	 
Taking into account that a large dissimilarity score is more ‘difficult’ to achieve when both dyad 
members have a large number of non-alliance ties, the proportion of dissimilar ties expected by 
chance reduces from 0.5 to 0.32 in the case of the agreement indices. This value is smaller than 
the observed proportion of dissimilarity of 0.4. As a consequence, the similarity scores of pi and κ 
change from a moderate positive value of 0.2 to a moderate negative value of -0.25. 
FIGURE 5 about here 
In the two examples considered so far, dyad members had identical marginal distributions, so pi 
and κ yielded identical values. However, this observation changes when we consider the effect of 
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bias. The lower half of Figure 5 illustrates a situation in which the marginal distributions are 
unbalanced in a perfectly asymmetrical manner. State X has alliance commitments to only 30 per 
cent of the other states in the system, but State Y has alliance commitments to 70 per cent of the 
other states. Again, the proportion of dissimilarity is kept constant at 0.4, which means that S 
remains constant at 0.2. Yet by averaging the observed marginal proportions of dyad members to 
estimate the ‘true’ marginal proportions, pi also remains the same. Only κ takes bias into account 
by adjusting its similarity score for differential propensities of dyad members to form alliance 
commitments: 
'):  KM> = KM>  KM	> = KM	>  KM> 
')B  *;+0 = +0	 <-,
;+,0 = +0,	 <  ;
KMC = KM.
	 <

= ;KM. = KMC	 <

 KM	> = KM	>  KM> 
')H  *+0+0,
-,
 KMCKMC = KM.KM.  KM1I = KMKI  KM>G 
When alliance ties of dyad members are asymmetrically distributed, then it is ‘easier’ to exhibit a 
large proportion of dissimilar ties simply by chance. Only κ’s chance-correction takes this 
consideration into account, resulting in a higher chance-dissimilarity of 0.58 compared to the 
chance-dissimilarity of 0.5 of S and pi. Correspondingly, κ’s similarity value also increases from 
0.2 to 0.31.  
In summary, the chance-correction model implicit in S expects that states will agree on 50 
per cent of their alliance ties by chance, regardless of the actually observed marginal 
distributions of the alliance commitments of the two dyad members. The S score is a simple 
linear transformation of the proportion of dissimilarity. In contrast, the calculation of pi and κ 
does not rely solely on the observed proportion of dissimilarity. Their chance-correction models 
also take information about the prevalence of certain types of ties into account when calculating 
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similarity scores. For a given observed proportion of dissimilarity, their scores are lower the 
more prevalent a certain type of tie. In addition, κ also takes into account differential propensities 
of states to form alliance ties. For a given observed proportion of dissimilarity, the similarity 
score of κ is higher the larger the differences are between dyad members’ marginal proportions. 
The value of Cohen’s κ can be lower or higher than the value of S, depending on whether the 
effect of prevalence or the effect of bias outweighs the other (Lantz and Nebenzahl 1996, 434). 
As Scott’s pi adjusts S only downwards, its similarity score is always the same or lower than the 
scores of S and κ. 
4 Scott’s pi and Cohen’s κ for quantitative data 
Signorino and Ritter’s S is routinely calculated on data with valued alliance ties.11 The two 
chance-corrected agreement indices are readily extended to the case of interval-level data as 
well. Krippendorff (1970) provides formulations of pi and κ in terms of two variables X and Y, 
representing the two tie profiles of the dyad members (see also Fay 2005). To measure the 
degree of dissimilarity between the two profiles, squared or absolute distances between tie values 
are often calculated (e.g. Shankar and Bangdiwala 2008, 447). However, the squared distances 
are usually preferred “because of historical precedent, simplifications, and some nice properties” 
(Fay 2005, 175; see also Krippendorff 1970, 141). Unless stated otherwise, I follow this 
                                                 
11
 While different types of alliance commitments are regularly treated as if they were ordered on 
an interval scale, this assumption is extremely questionable and I do not recommend relying on 
it. Unfortunately, most previous applications of S have treated the strength of alliance 
commitments as if they were based on quantitative data. Hence, for purely comparative reasons, 
I follow this practice in the remainder of this paper. 
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convention in the remainder of this paper. The formulas for Scott’s pi and Cohen’s κ for 
quantitative data take the following form:12 
D    ∑  

∑;  N = N	 <

= ∑;  N = N	 <
 										 
J    ∑  

∑  N = ∑  N = ∑N  N 											 
For comparative purposes, S can be expressed in a similar form: 
  	  ∑  


	∑
   ∑  

∑E  	 F

= ∑E  	 F
 								. 
In all three equations, the sum of squared distances in the numerator captures the dissimilarity in 
the scale values of foreign policy ties. Like in the case of binary ties, the three formulas differ 
only in the calculation of the dissimilarity expected by chance, which is given in the 
denominator. Again, the denominator of S is equivalent to the expectation that half of the 
theoretically possible maximum dissimilarity will occur by chance. The last expression in 
equation (20) demonstrates that this chance-dissimilarity is equivalent to the sum of the 
theoretically possible maximum variability of each dyad member’s valued tie profile.  
The denominator of Scott’s pi consists of the sum of the observed variability of dyad 
members’ valued tie profiles around the grand mean. The grand mean is simply the average of 
                                                 
12
 Valued alliance data of a dyad can be represented in vector form, similar to the binary data 
example depicted in Figure 2a. The only difference is that the vector entries are not restricted to 
0s and 1s, but can range from 0 = ‘no commitment’, 1 = ‘entente’, 2 = ‘neutrality or 
nonaggression pact’, to 3 = ‘defense pact’. All elements of equations (11) to (13) can be directly 
calculated from the information in those vectors. 
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the two profile-specific means. Calculating the deviations from the grand mean rather than the 
profile-specific means reflects the assumption of homogenous marginal distributions. Unlike the 
chance-correction of S, which uses the mid-point of the scale as the ‘grand mean’, the chance-
correction of pi uses an empirical estimate of the grand mean. In this way, pi takes into account 
that the two distributions might be symmetrically unbalanced or skewed in a similar way towards 
one or the other end of the scale. In contrast, the denominator of Cohen’s κ assumes that chance-
dissimilarity is equal to the sum of the variability in the two dyad members’ valued tie profiles 
plus the difference in their means. The variability of each tie profile is calculated around its 
profile-specific mean, implying that no assumption is made that the dyad members’ propensity to 
establish foreign policy ties is identical. Adding the sum of the squared distances of the profile-
specific means to κ’s denominator indicates that asymmetrically unbalanced distributions are not 
considered to be a source of dissimilarity. On the contrary, the larger denominator directly results 
in a larger similarity score. To summarize, when ties are valued, prevalence takes the form of 
both dyad members having mean tie strength values similarly larger or lower than the mid-point 
of the scale, and bias takes the form of dyad members differing in their mean tie strength values. 
5 The empirical consequences of chance-correction 
Up to this point, I have discussed the conceptual differences between Signorino and Ritter’s 
(1999) S and the two chance-corrected agreement indices. For applications of those measures, it 
is important to assess whether the use of chance-corrected agreement indices is likely to lead to 
different empirical similarity values and different results of statistical analyses. For this purpose, 
I first present the distribution of values of the different similarity measures before turning to a 
replication of Gartzke’s (2007) study of the ‘Capitalist Peace’. 
Figure 6 about here 
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Figure 6 compares the empirical distributions of S, pi and κ. The first row of panels is based on 
valued alliance data (Correlates of War Project 2003), and the second row on valued voting data 
from the UN General Assembly (Voeten and Merdzanovic 2009).13 In both rows, the left panel 
shows that S scores clearly tend towards the upper end of the similarity scale (see also Bennett 
and Rupert 2003, 374). Taking these values literally, they indicate that almost all dyads have 
more common than diverging foreign policy positions. Given the observed preponderance of 
conflict in the international system, this seems to be a rather unrealistic description. In contrast, 
the distributions of both pi in the middle column and κ in the right column are centred on zero. 
To investigate the consequences of replacing S by pi or κ in statistical analyses, I replicate 
Erik Gartzke’s (2007) study of the determinants of international conflict in the post-World 
War II era. Gartzke’s (2007, 166) main argument is that ‘economic development, capital market 
integration, and the compatibility of foreign policy preferences’, rather than joint democracy, 
account for the ‘dyadic democratic peace’. Relying on logistic regression with a specification 
similar to Oneal and Russett’s (1999) as a baseline model, Gartzke’s reported results consistently 
show that the effects of democracy variables reduce in size and become statistically insignificant 
after adding liberal economic variables to the model.  
Gartzke uses three different conflict measures as dependent variables: militarized interstate 
disputes, wars, and fatal militarized interstate disputes. The following discussion focuses on his 
analysis of the onset of war (Model 7 in Gartzke’s Table 2), as the replication of this analysis 
resulted in the most disparate findings. The analysis of war onset is also of particular substantive 
                                                 
13
 The UN voting variable distinguishes three values: 1 = ‘Yes’, 2 = ‘Abstain’, 3 = ‘No’. Based 
on these data, having voted in a similar way on the same UN resolutions determines the degree to 
which dyad members’ foreign policy positions are judged to be similar. 
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importance, ‘as in some respects the most robust formulation of the democratic peace involves 
war’ (Gartzke 2007, 179). Despite the prominence of the role of similar interests in Gartzke’s 
theoretical argument, he includes the foreign policy similarity variable only in the analysis of all 
militarized interstate disputes, not in the analysis of fatal militarized disputes or the analysis of 
wars. Gartzke (2007, 180) explains that the variable is omitted ‘because it is not statistically 
significant in these regressions’. While my replication results for fatal militarized disputes 
(Model 9 in Gartzke’s Table 2) are consistent with this claim, my replications results for war 
cannot reproduce this finding. In fact, the replication results show a statistically significant 
positive rather than the expected negative effect of foreign policy similarity on the probability of 
war onset. Even more problematically, the statistical inferences about two other explanatory 
variables change once Gartzke’s S measure is included in the analysis.  
Figure 7 illustrates the changes in regression coefficients and corresponding 95 per cent 
confidence intervals resulting from changes in the way foreign policy similarity is or is not 
included in Gartzke’s Model 7. The first model specification (‘S omitted’) replicates Gartzke’s 
original regression results excluding any measure of foreign policy similarity. The second model 
specification (‘S [Gartzke]’) introduces Gartzke’s own S measure, which is based on two-valued 
UN voting data, treating abstentions as missing values. Treating abstentions as missing values 
results in a loss of a lot of information, as the abstention by one of the two dyad members is 
sufficient to discard the entire vote from the computation of the similarity measure. Thus, the 
computations for my similarity measures are based on three-valued voting data. The third and 
fourth models both include S measures, but based on different distance metrics. This comparison 
allows us to distinguish between the effect of the distance metric and more qualitative properties 
of the similarity measures. The third model specification (‘S [abs. dist.]’) includes S based on 
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absolute distances and the fourth (‘S [sqrd. dist.]’) includes S based on squared distances. Finally, 
the last two model specifications employ Scott’s τ and Cohen’s κ, both based on squared 
distance metrics.   
Figure 7 about here 
Each panel in Figure 7 presents the replication results for one of the main explanatory variables 
in the regression model. The absence of statistically significant effects of the democracy 
variables and the trade dependence variable, a statistically significant negative effect of financial 
openness, a positive effect of GDP per capita, and a negative effect of the interaction between 
GDP per capita and contiguity emerge as a consistent finding from Gartzke’s study. However, 
this general finding does not hold for the regression analysis of war onset once S is included in 
the model specification. The regression coefficient for S is statistically significant, but its sign 
points in the ‘wrong’ direction. More seriously, the inclusion of S changes the statistical 
inferences about two of the other six explanatory variables. The interaction term of GDP per 
capita with contiguity loses its statistical significance, while the variable recording the higher of 
the two democracy scores of the dyad members becomes statistically significant. The statistically 
positive effect of the latter variable contradicts Gartzke’s core argument that regime type 
variables lose their explanatory power after controlling for liberal economic variables. As Figure 
7 shows, only model specifications that replace S by τ or κ can reproduce and bolster Gartzke’s 
original claim. Thus, the replication results demonstrate that the choice of similarity measure can 
have profound impacts on the conclusions drawn from a statistical analysis. 
6 The proof of the pudding is in the eating 
Chance-corrected agreement indices like Scott’s pi and Cohen’s κ have several desirable 
properties for measuring the similarity of state’s foreign policy positions in the dyadic analysis of 
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international relations. While they assess the dissimilarity of dyad members’ foreign policy tie 
profiles in a similar manner as Signorino and Ritter’s S (1999), pi and κ differ crucially to S in the 
way they standardize the degree of dissimilarity. S relies on a standardization method that is 
equivalent to a rather arbitrary chance-correction method, which will usually yield implausibly 
high similarity values. In contrast, the chance-corrections of pi and κ are based on the actually 
observed, empirical distributions of dyad members’ foreign policy ties. Both measures adjust the 
similarity score for states’ generally low propensity to form foreign policy ties. In addition, κ 
also adjusts the similarity score for differences in the individual propensities of states to form 
foreign policy ties. Whether or not the latter correction is reasonable depends mainly on the 
process supposed to generate the foreign policy tie data. If the data consist of alliance 
commitments, then the costs of ties are rather large and the assumption that states have different 
propensities to establish such ties seems reasonable. In this case, Cohen’s κ is more appropriate 
than Scott’s pi. If the data consist of ties that are cheap to establish, such as a similar vote in the 
General Assembly of the UN, then the assumption that all states have the same propensity to 
form a tie might be justified. In such a situation, differences in tie-formation reflect real 
differences in foreign policy positions and pi is preferable to κ as a measure of similarity. 
An empirical comparison of similarity values shows clear differences between S on the one 
hand and the two chance-corrected agreement indices on the other hand. While S scores tend 
towards 1, pi and κ scores are concentrated around zero. In addition, a replication analysis of 
Gartzke’s (2007) study of the ‘Capitalist Peace’ demonstrates that the replacement of S by 
Scott’s pi or Cohen’s κ can lead to different statistical inferences, not only about the effect of 
foreign policy similarity itself, but also about the effects of other explanatory variables estimated 
in the same regression model. 
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Representing the similarity of two vectors in a single number is a surprisingly complex 
problem. Every similarity measure has its strengths and weaknesses and none is in any 
meaningful way ‘wrong’. Similarity measures represent exactly what they are mathematically 
defined to represent and good arguments can usually be found to advocate the use of each of 
them. In the end, the main yardstick of any similarity measure is the plausibility of the scores it 
produces. It is in this sense that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’. Although face validity 
is an especially shaky standard, most informed observers will agree that the United Kingdom’s 
foreign policy positions during the Cold War were considerably more similar to the positions of 
the United States than the positions of the Soviet Union. While the scores for Scott’s pi and 
Cohen’s κ reflect this consensus, S produces similarity values for the UK-Soviet Union dyad that 
are just below or above the similarity values of the UK-US dyad (Figure 1). The preceding 
discussion has shown that these implausible S scores are not due to exceptional circumstances 
that only affect this example, but result from general features built into the standardization of 
dissimilarity scores in S. The generality of the problem is also illustrated by the distribution of S 
scores (Figure 6). Taking these similarity values literally, states hardly ever have serious 
differences in opinion, a description that seems to be contradicted by much of human history 
since the invention of the modern state. In this respect, Scott’s pi and Cohen’s κ offer very 
attractive alternative options for measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions and should 
be a valuable addition to the researcher’s toolkit.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 Replication of Gartzke’s (2007, 181) logistic regression analysis of war onset (Model 7 in 
Table 2) using different measures of foreign policy similarity. 
 S omitted S  
Gartzke 
S 
abs. dist. 
S 
sqrd. dist. 
Scott's τ Cohen's κ 
Foreign policy similarity  2.386* 3.412* 3.595* 1.193 -0.078 
  (0.847) (0.986) (1.177) (1.003) (1.076) 
Democracy (low) 0.037 0.023 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.037 
 (0.066) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.062) 
Democracy (high) -0.008 0.067* 0.093* 0.080* 0.026 -0.009 
 (0.051) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.040) (0.040) 
Trade dependence (low) -48.757 -72.101 -70.511 -69.576 -65.884 -49.220 
 (125.102) (146.172) (139.441) (140.367) (133.993) (125.668) 
Financial openness (low) -0.464* -0.540* -0.528* -0.530* -0.479* -0.462* 
 (0.161) (0.161) (0.148) (0.151) (0.161) (0.165) 
GDP per capita (low) 0.266* 0.275* 0.258* 0.263* 0.247* 0.266* 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
GDP per capita x contiguity -0.419* -0.312 -0.321 -0.328 -0.362 -0.418* 
 (0.192) (0.189) (0.199) (0.200) (0.187) (0.198) 
Contiguity 4.655* 4.382* 4.370* 4.397* 4.527* 4.630* 
 (0.719) (0.828) (0.845) (0.846) (0.760) (0.718) 
Distance -0.294 -0.516* -0.549* -0.532* -0.370 -0.293 
 (0.191) (0.210) (0.213) (0.217) (0.221) (0.201) 
Major power 1.550 2.678* 2.905* 2.697* 1.871 1.571 
 (1.257) (1.209) (1.258) (1.232) (1.303) (1.292) 
Alliance -1.053 -1.246* -1.248* -1.255* -1.305 -1.052 
 (0.644) (0.530) (0.514) (0.523) (0.709) (0.771) 
Capability ratio -0.695* -0.895* -0.913* -0.900* -0.749* -0.691* 
 (0.229) (0.214) (0.212) (0.217) (0.215) (0.229) 
North America 1.087 0.396 0.371 0.379 0.734 1.102 
 (0.951) (0.961) (0.992) (0.984) (0.902) (0.932) 
Africa 0.629 0.765 0.763 0.757 0.725 0.646 
 (0.952) (0.938) (0.921) (0.929) (0.931) (0.949) 
Middle East 2.364* 2.522* 2.507* 2.530* 2.369* 2.363* 
 (0.634) (0.700) (0.708) (0.694) (0.652) (0.636) 
Asia -0.234 -0.747 -1.063 -0.904 -0.493 -0.114 
 (0.843) (0.790) (0.764) (0.760) (0.819) (0.847) 
N 165194 159998 158022 158022 158022 158022 
Log likelihood -180.73 -173.99 -171.17 -172.93 -178.61 -180.43 
Chi-squared 312.06* 418.76* 392.16* 429.83* 338.92* 334.03* 
Estimation results for the constant term and the temporal splines are omitted. Regional dummies for Europe and 
South America were automatically dropped from the analysis.  
* =  p < 0.05 (two-tailed significance tests).  
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Fig. 1 Similarity values of dyads involving the United Kingdom (1950-1990). The figure compares 
similarity values of dyads involving the United Kingdom and other permanent members of the UN 
Security Council during the Cold War. Panel (a) shows similarity values generated by Signorino and 
Ritter’s S with a squared distance metric, Panel (b) shows values generated by Scott’s pi, and Panel (c) 
shows values generated by Cohen’s κ. The measures are based on alliance data for all members of the 
international state system (Correlates of War Project 2003, 2005). 
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 (a) Column vectors 
 
(b) Contingency table 
 X Y |Xi-Yi|   Absolute frequencies Y  
X 1 0 1     0 1  
Y 0 1 1   
X 
0 4 3 7 
A 0 1 1   1 2 1 3 
B 1 0 1     6 4 10 
C 0 0 0   Relative frequencies Y  
D 0 0 0     0 1  
E 1 1 0   
X 
0 .40 .30 .70 
F 0 1 1   1 .20 .10 .30 
G 0 0 0     .60 .40 1 
H 0 0 0    
 
 
  
Σ 5   
     
     
      
Calculation    Calculation     
   
 
 
      
Do = |Xi - Yi| 5   Do = b + c  5  
Dmax = Σdmax 10   Dmax =ndmax 10  
Pd = Do/Dmax .50   Pd = Do/Dmax  .50  
S = 1 - 2Pd .00   S = 1 - 2Pd  .00  
  
   
 
     
Fig. 2 Two ways of calculating S. The figure illustrates the calculation of S from hypothetical, binary 
alliance data of dyad members X and Y. Panel (a) demonstrates the calculation of S directly from the two 
column vectors representing alliance portfolios. Panel (b) demonstrates the calculation of S from the data 
contained in the contingency table of the two alliance portfolios. N = 10 countries; 0 denotes the absence 
and 1 denotes the presence of an alliance commitment.   
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 (a) No prevalence, no bias  (b) Prevalence, no bias  (c) Bias, no prevalence 
Observed dissimilarity          
  State Y    State Y    State Y  
  0 1    0 1    0 1  
State X 
0 .30 .20 .50 
 
0 .60 .20 .80 
 
0 .30 .40 .70 
1 .20 .30 .50 
 
1 .20 .00 .20 
 
1 .00 .30 .30 
  .50 .50 1   .80 .20 1   .30 .70 1 
 Do = .40, S = .20  Do = .40, S = .20  Do = .40, S = .20 
Possible minimum dissimilarity         
  0 1    0 1    0 1  
State X 
0 .50 .00 .50 
 
0 .80 .00 .80 
 
0 .30 .40 .70 
1 .00 .50 .50 
 
1 .00 .20 .20 
 
1 .00 .30 .30 
  .50 .50 1   .80 .20 1   .30 .70 1 
 min(Do) = .00  min(Do) = .00  min(Do) = .40 
Possible maximum dissimilarity         
  0 1    0 1    0 1  
State X 
0 .00 .50 .50 
 
0 .60 .20 .80 
 
0 .00 .70 .70 
1 .50 .00 .50 
 
1 .20 .00 .20 
 
1 .30 .00 .30 
  .50 .50 1   .80 .20 1   .30 .70 1 
 max(Do) = 1.00  max(Do) = .40  max(Do) = 1.00 
      
Fig. 3 Unbalanced marginal distributions do not affect S. ‘Prevalence’ stands for symmetrically 
unbalanced marginal distributions; ‘bias’ for asymmetrically unbalanced marginal distributions. All cell 
entries are proportions (relative frequencies). Do denotes the proportion of dissimilarity and is the sum of 
the entries in the off-diagonal cells of the contingency tables. Multiplying Do by 2 and subtracting it from 
1 creates Signorino and Ritter’s S. Minimum dissimilarity is the smallest proportion of ties that has to be 
in the off-diagonal cells, given the observed distribution of the marginals. Maximum dissimilarity is the 
maximum proportion of ties that could be in the off-diagonal cells, given the observed distribution of 
marginals. 
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(a) Signorino and Ritter’s S  (b) Scott’s pi  (c) Cohen’s κ 
Observed dissimilarity 
         
  State Y    State Y    State Y  
  0 1    0 1    0 1  
State X 
0 .30 .20 .50 
 
0 .30 .20 .50 
 
0 .30 .20 .50 
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1 .20 .30 .50 
 
1 .20 .30 .50 
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 Do = 0.20 + 0.20 = 0.40  Do = 0.20 + 0.20 = 0.40  Do = 0.20 + 0.20 = 0.40 
Chance dissimilarity 
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Fig. 4 The effect of chance-correction in the absence of prevalence and bias. 
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 (a) Signorino and Ritter’s S   (b) Scott’s pi   (c) Cohen’s κ 
Prevalence, no bias 
         
Observed State Y    State Y    State Y  
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Fig. 5 The effect of chance-correction in the presence of prevalence or bias  
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Fig. 6 Empirical distributions of similarity measures. The similarity measures in the first row of panels 
are based on alliance data of the Correlates of War Project (2003). The measures in the second row of 
panels are based on data of voting in the UN General Assembly (Voeten and Merdzanovic 2009). 
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Fig. 7 The determinants of war: replication of Gartzke’s (2007) ‘Capitalist Peace’. The figure provides 
logistic regression coefficients and 95 per cent confidence intervals for the theoretically interesting 
variables of Model 7 in Table 2 of Gartzke (2007, 181). The dependent variable is the onset of war. The 
first model specification excludes any measure of similarity and is a direct replication of Gartzke’s 
results. The second model specification includes Gartzke’s original measure of S, which is based on two-
valued UN General Assembly voting data that treats abstentions as missing values. The remaining model 
specifications employ similarity measures that are based on three-valued UN voting data. The third 
specification includes S based on absolute distances and the fourth includes S based on squared distances. 
The last two specifications include Scott’s pi and Cohen’s κ, both based on squared distances. The 
complete numerical regression results of the replication study are provided in Table A1 in the appendix. 
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